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Based on static partial equilibrium analysis, the “new brain drain” literature argues that, 
by raising the return to education, a brain drain generates a brain gain that is, under 
certain conditions, larger than the brain drain itself, and that such a net brain gain results 
in an increase in welfare and growth due to education’s positive externalities. This paper 
argues that these claims are exaggerated. In the static case, and based on both partial and 
general equilibrium considerations, the paper shows that i) the size of the brain gain is 
smaller than suggested in that literature; ii) the impact on welfare and growth is smaller 
as well (for any brain gain size); iii) a positive brain gain is likely to result in a smaller, 
possibly negative, human capital gain; iv) an increase in the stock of human capital may 
have a negative impact on welfare and growth; and v) in a dynamic framework, the paper 
shows that the steady-state brain gain is equal to the brain drain so that a ‘beneficial brain 
drain’ cannot take place, and a net brain loss is likely during the transition. 
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Brain Gain: Claims about its Size and Impact on  




The negative impact of the brain drain on the development of source countries has 
generally been accepted as received wisdom. However, a recent ‘new brain drain’ 
literature has challenged this view. The major claims of the new literature are described 
in Section 1.1, and Section 1.2 presents the paper’s main findings.  
 
1.1. Claims of the ‘New Brain Drain’ Literature 
 
The traditional brain drain literature has viewed the exodus of human capital as 
something of a curse for developing countries, and has considered policies to counter it or 
reduce its negative impact on the emigration countries, including the taxation of 
migrants’ income abroad (Bhagwati 1976, Bhagwati and Hamada 1976, Bhagwati and 
Wilson 1989).
1 
2 That literature has recognized that the brain drain does confer certain 
benefits, including increased trade, remittances, knowledge, FDI (attributed in part to a 
“Diaspora” effect (Lucas 2005)), as well as the skills acquired by return migrants in the 
destination country.
3    
A benefit not considered in the traditional brain drain literature is the brain-drain- 
induced ‘brain gain,’ a central feature of the ‘new brain drain’ literature. Since a brain 
drain implies that a share of skilled individuals will migrate and earn a higher wage 
abroad, the new brain drain literature posits that:  
                                                 
1 This remains the view of the majority of analysts working on this issue (e.g., see Solimano 2001).   
2 On a nationalist view of the brain drain in this literature, see Patinkin (1968). On an internationalist view, 
see Johnson (1968) and Bhagwati and Wilson (1989).  
3 See also Ozden (Chapter 8 in this volume) and Javorcik, Ozden and Spatareanu (2004). They show that a 
larger stock of immigrants from a given source country to the US results in greater US outward FDI to that 
country, with the effect essentially due to skilled immigrants. 
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i) the brain drain raises the expected return on education;  
ii) this induces additional investment in education (a brain gain);  
iii) this may result in a ‘beneficial brain drain’ or net brain gain, i.e., in a brain 
gain that is larger than the brain drain; and  
iv) a net brain gain raises welfare and growth. 
 
These results are said to hold independently of other potential effects of the brain 
drain on the level of education, whether through remittances or through the skills return 
migrants might have acquired in the destination countries.  
Seminal papers in the new brain drain literature include Mountford (1997), Stark 
et al. (1997, 1998), Stark and Wang (2002), Stark (2004), Stark et al. (2004), Beine et al. 
(2001, 2003), Docquier and Rapoport (2004), and Vidal (1998).
4 Their work has led to a 
reconsideration of the impact of the brain drain on the number of skilled individuals and 
on economic welfare and growth in the source country. 
Most studies in that literature are theoretical, though empirical results are slowly 
emerging thanks to the work of Carrington and Detragiache (1998, 1999), Adams (2003) 
Docquier and Marfouk (Chapter 6 in this volume; 2004), and Dumont and Lemaitre 
(2005).
5 These studies have estimated the stock of skilled migrants from developing 
countries who are living in OECD countries.
6 
                                                 
4 Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters (2004) provide a survey of the brain drain literature.  
5 An analysis of regional differences in the brain drain is provided by Docquier et al. (2005). 
6 Carrington and Detragiache used the 1990 US census data to estimate the brain drain for a number of 
developing countries in 1990. Docquier and Marfouk (Chapter 6 in this volume) improved the 
measurement of the brain drain by expanding data sources to all OECD countries, estimating the brain 
drain for a larger number of developing countries, and doing so for the year 2000 as well as for 1990. They 
also provide estimates of the brain drain between developed countries.     4
The number of skilled migrants--and their share in total migration--has risen 
dramatically in recent decades. Docquier and Hillel (2004) report that the number of 
migrants residing in OECD countries increased by 50% between 1990 and 2000, with the 
increase in the number of skilled migrants equal to 2.5 times that of unskilled ones (70% 
versus 28%).  
A case in point is the flight of human capital in the health sector, with the more 
extreme cases of emigration taking place in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean. For 
instance, Stalker (1994) reports that Jamaica has had to train five doctors in order to 
retain one, a brain drain of 80%.  
The necessity to assess the validity of the claims of the new brain drain literature 
has increased with the growing flight of skilled workers from developing countries and 
with the recent tilt towards skilled labor immigration policies by host countries. This 
paper provides such an assessment, based on a more detailed analysis of the relationship 
between the brain drain and brain gain.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Based on partial equilibrium 
analysis, Section 2 shows why the brain gain is likely to be smaller than appears from the 
new brain drain literature. Section 3 does so from a general equilibrium perspective while 
Section 4 examines the impact of the brain gain on welfare and growth from a general 
equilibrium perspective. The latter has not been incorporated in the new brain drain 
literature, even though it is central to the analysis of the brain gain size and its impact on 
welfare and growth. 
Section 5 provides a dynamic analysis of the new brain drain literature’s claim 
regarding the net brain gain. Specifically, it examines whether a net brain gain—or   5
beneficial brain drain--can possibly hold in the steady state and how it evolves in the 
transition period. Such analysis is crucial for understanding the impact of the brain drain 
on development and growth. The analysis in Section 5.1 is based on partial equilibrium 
and an exogenous domestic wage rate, while a partial and general equilibrium analysis 
with an endogenous wage rate is provided in Section 5.2. Section 6 describes the limited 
empirical evidence on this issue and Section 7 concludes.  
 
  1.2. Main Findings 
This paper examines some of the assumptions underlying the findings of the new 
brain drain literature. It concludes that the impact of the brain drain on welfare and 
growth is likely to be significantly smaller, and the likelihood of a negative impact on 
welfare and growth significantly greater, than reported in that literature. This is based on 
the findings that i) the brain gain is smaller than has been obtained in the new brain drain 
literature, ii) the brain gain implies a smaller human capital gain, and iii) various negative 
effects of the brain gain on other sources of externalities human capital, welfare and 
growth have not been taken into account. These findings are derived from both partial 
and general equilibrium analysis.  
Arguments for a smaller brain gain, resulting in a smaller net brain gain (brain 
gain minus brain drain) or net brain loss, and implying a smaller or negative impact on 
welfare and growth, include the fact that  
i)  abilities are heterogeneous and high-ability individuals—those who 
acquired skills when migration was not an option and the returns to   6
education were lower--will emigrate, resulting in a lower average ability 
level for the educated people remaining in the source country;  
ii)  unskilled individuals migrate as well and benefit from it, implying that the 
brain drain has a smaller impact on the return to education;  
iii)  the education benefit is subject to a high degree of uncertainty (e.g., with 
respect to educational success, future employment abroad, host countries’ 
future migration policies, and whether the individual will be among the 
few who migrate), and so is the cost of education (e.g., due to changes in 
the opportunity cost of time during the study period caused, say, by 
income or health problems in the student’s family); and  
iv)  additional resources spent on education imply greater public and private 
expenditures and--since students do not work fulltime or at all--fewer 
taxes and less household income, resulting in a reduction in other public 
and private expenditures which also generate externalities, such as 
expenditures on health and public infrastructure, with a smaller and 
possibly negative impact on welfare and growth.   
An analysis of the dynamics of the brain drain shows that the net brain gain is 
equal to zero in the steady state. In other words, a ‘beneficial brain drain’ cannot occur in 
the steady state. Moreover, a net brain loss is likely to hold during the transition.  
Contributors to the early brain drain literature viewed the brain drain as entailing 
a loss for the developing source countries. An implication of the arguments presented in 
this paper is that their views were probably close to the mark.  
   7
2. Smaller Brain Gain: Partial Equilibrium 
Sections 2 and 3 argue that the brain gain is smaller than is claimed by the new 
brain drain literature. This section presents arguments based on partial equilibrium 
analysis. General equilibrium considerations are examined in Section 3.  
 
2.1. Graphical Analysis 
Before turning to these arguments, it seems useful to provide a simple graphical 
representation of the central issue examined in this paper. It reflects a static partial 
equilibrium view of the issue. Figure 1 shows, on the vertical axis, the brain drain (BD), 
the brain gain (BG) and the net brain gain (NBG = BG – BD), as a proportion of the 
skilled labor force. These are shown as functions of the skilled-migration probability p 
(i.e., the share of the brain drain in the skilled labor force).   
The brain drain BD is defined in the same way on both the horizontal and vertical 
axes, and it is therefore drawn as a 45-degree line rising from zero at p = 0 to the entire 
skilled labor force at p = 1. The brain gain BG = 0 for p = 0 (the no-migration situation) 
and p = 1 (all newly educated individuals migrate), and positive for 0 < p < 1. 
Figure 1 presents two alternative brain gain curves, BG = BG1 and BG = BG2. In 
the case of BG1--the type of brain gain assumed in the new brain drain literature, the net 
brain gain NBG1 is positive for p < p1 and negative for p > p1. Thus, a brain drain would 
result in a net increase in education for low migration probabilities (for a small brain 
drain relative to the skilled labor force).  
This paper argues that the actual brain gain is closer to BG2 than to BG1 (or is 
actually equal to BG2) with a negative net brain gain (NBG2 < 0) or a net brain loss for   8
any p > 0. Note also that NBG is negative for large values of p, irrespective of whether 
BG is equal to BG1 or BG2. This is one result on which the new brain drain literature and 
this paper agree. 
 
  2.2. Heterogeneity 
    2.2.1. Individual Heterogeneity  
Assume, for simplicity, that ability—or talent--is distributed uniformly and that an 
individual’s ability affects the benefit of education but not its cost which is a constant C. 
This is shown in Figure 2, which draws on Commander et al. (2004). Ability is measured 
on the horizontal axis and declines from right to left, with the highest ability equal to 
AMAX.  The benefit and cost of education are measured on the vertical axis.  
Figure 2 also shows three parallel lines declining from right to left, which depict 
the benefit of education under different circumstances. The lower line shows the benefit 
of education obtained in the absence of migration, i.e., the domestic wage. The top line 
shows the benefit of education obtained by migrants in the destination country, i.e., the 
foreign wage. The middle line shows the expected benefit of education, which is equal to 
a weighted average of the foreign and domestic wages. The weights are p for the foreign 
wage) and (1– p) for the domestic age, where p is the migration probability (share of 
migrants in the skilled population).    
In the absence of migration, the equilibrium is at A*. Under migration, 
equilibrium is at A**, with a brain gain equal to (A** - A*). However, one cannot simply 
compare (A** - A*) and (A* - AMAX) because the two groups have different ability levels. 
Recalling that the distribution of abilities is uniform, individuals who acquired education   9
in the absence of migration have an average ability level ANM = (A* + AMAX)/2, which is 
greater than the average ability level AM = (A** + A*)/2 of those who acquired education 
once migration became possible. Since AM < ANM, it is not necessarily the case that a net 
brain gain takes place when the share of the brain gain (relative to the total number of 
educated individuals) BGS = ( A** - A*)/(A** - AMAX) is larger than the migration 
probability p.   
In the absence of migration, the source country can draw on benefits from its most 
able individuals (with ability between AMAX and A*). Recalling that the new brain drain 
literature assumes that skilled migrants are selected randomly among all skilled 
individuals with probability p, a share p of migrants originates from both the more able 
group (between AMAX and A*) and the less able group (between A* and A**).  
Consequently, the skilled individuals remaining in the source country consists of a 
share (1 - p) of non-migrants from both the more able and the less able groups, with an 
average ability of AMIG = (AMAX + A**)/2, compared to the higher average ability ANM = 
(A* + AMAX)/2 of those who got educated in the absence of migration.  
So, when BGS = p, i.e., when the number of skilled individuals in the source 
country is the same irrespective of whether migration takes place or not, migration results 
in a lower ability level in the source country by an amount equal to ANM - AMIG = (A* - 
A**)/2 and thus in a lower effective human capital stock.  
Thus, a brain drain results in a negative  net  effective brain gain—i.e., a net 
effective brain loss--when the number of skilled individuals remains unchanged once 
migration takes place, i.e., when BGS = p, and results in a greater loss when BGS < p. A   10
necessary but not sufficient condition for a net effective brain gain is BGS > p. In fact, a 
net effective brain loss may also occur in the case of BGS > p.
7  
The arguments presented in the following sections strongly suggest that, even in 
the case of a homogeneous population with identical abilities, the net brain gain is likely 
to be negative. However, even if one assumes that the net brain gain is equal to zero, the 
reduction in the average ability level (a net effective brain loss) associated with migration 
under heterogeneity is likely to have negative implications for welfare and growth.
8 
 
    2.2.2. Group Heterogeneity 
Heterogeneity may occur across groups rather than across individuals. This 
situation is depicted in Figure 3 which shows three groups with different ability levels. In 
the absence of migration, two groups acquire education and the lowest-ability group does 
not. Once migration takes place, the expected return to education rises, though not 
sufficiently for the low-ability group which does do not acquire education in this case 
either. Thus, the brain drain does not result in a brain gain (A** = A*), and the source 
                                                 
7 In an interesting paper, Fan and Stark (2005) present a model where decision-making takes place in three 
stages or less, and which generates equilibrium unemployment of skilled workers. The model assumes 
heterogeneity with respect to educational ability. However, given that ability in the job market tends to be 
positively related to educational ability, incorporating this feature would affect the results. 
8 In fact, the impact of migration on welfare and growth is likely to be significantly greater than might be 
inferred from the analysis above. Section 2.2.1 assumed, for simplicity, a uniform distribution of ability or 
talent. As Haque (2005) notes, there is evidence that the distribution of talent in developing countries is 
highly skewed (Power Law distribution), with a large number of individuals at most talent levels and a 
relatively small number of highly talented individuals. Thanks to recent advances in information and 
communication technology, there has been a dramatic acceleration in the globalization of knowledge. The 
highly talented individuals in developing countries tend to belong to the global knowledge community, 
cognizant of the latest advances in their field or contributing to them. Such individuals tend to generate 
very large positive externalities by imparting frontier knowledge to their colleagues, assistants and students, 
thereby also enabling those who benefit from that knowledge to further diffuse it. For instance, surgeons 
who are pioneers tend to form medical centers with teams of doctors working with them, and top scientists 
often generate top scientists. Haque (2005) provides an analysis that shows that, given that the cost of 
migration is lowest for highly talented individuals, they are the most likely to migrate, and their departure is 
likely to have an enormous impact on their country of origin that goes way beyond their tiny share in the 
skilled population.    
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country loses some of its most able individuals.
9 Alternatively, if the low-ability group 
acquires education, we obtain the same result as for individual heterogeneity (Section 
2.2.1). 
 
2.3. Unskilled Migration 
Most analyses in the new brain drain literature examine the incentives to acquire 
education in the absence of migration and compare them to the incentives prevailing in 
the case of skilled worker migration. However, the reality is that out-migration of 
unskilled workers is substantial in most source countries, and their expected wage is 
higher under migration, just as is true for skilled workers.
10 
Denote the migration probability of skilled (unskilled) labor by p  (q), skilled 
(unskilled) variables by subscript S (U), and destination country variables by *. In the 
absence of migration (p = q = 0), the education benefit or skill premium is 
U S W W B − = 1 .           ( 4 )  
    With a brain drain (p > 0, q = 0), the expected benefit of education is 
     ) ( ) ( ) ) 1 ( (
* *
2 S S U S U S S W W p W W W W p pW B − + − = − − + = ,    (5)   
                                                 
9 Stark (…) includes two groups in his model where, as assumed here, low-ability individuals do not 
acquire education when migration takes place, though high-ability individuals invest more in education 
when incentives improve. The model presented here assumes, as in most papers dealing with the brain gain, 
that individuals can only acquire a fixed amount of education.    
 
10 The new data set on migration by educational attainment put together by Docquier and Marfouk (Chapter 
5 in this volume), and which covers 174 countries for 1990 and 195 countries for 2000, indicates that, for 
1990, the average migration share—i.e., the migration probability--of the middle and high-education 
groups put together is about twice as large than in the low-education group. The recent immigration policy 
change favoring skilled migrants is reflected in the 2000 figures, with the share of the middle and high-
education groups about 2.5 times larger than in the low-education group. Though the share of the middle 
and high-education groups is larger than that of the low-education one, 2 to 2.5 times larger is less than 
infinitely larger, which is the assumption in the new brain drain literature where the share of migrants in the 
low-education group is set equal to zero.     12
i.e.,  2 B  is equal to the domestic skill premium (as in equation (4)) plus the expected 
skilled labor migration premium.   
  With migration by both skilled and unskilled labor (p, q > 0), the expected benefit 
of education is  
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ) 1 ( ( ) ) 1 ( (
* * * *
3 U U S S U S U U S S W W q W W p W W W q qW W p pW B − − − + − = − + − − + = . 
 (6) 
Thus,  3 B  is equal to the domestic skill premium plus the expected skilled labor 
migration premium minus the expected unskilled labor migration premium. Equations (4) 
and (5) show that a brain drain raises the expected return to education by the expected 
migration benefit:  
) (
*
1 2 S S S W W p B B B − = − ≡ Δ   >   0 .          ( 7 )    
This implies a brain gain, a basic finding of the new brain drain literature.  
Equations (5) and (6) show that when both skilled and unskilled labor can 
migrate, the expected return to education falls compared to the case where only the 
skilled can migrate, with the change equal to 
0 ) (
*
2 3 < − − = − ≡ Δ U U U W W q B B B ,        ( 8 )  
and the net benefit of education in this case is  
) ( ) (
* *
U U S S U S E W W q W W p B B B − − − = Δ + Δ ≡ Δ        ( 9 )    
Thus, the impact of a brain drain on the return to education is smaller under the 
assumption that unskilled workers can migrate as well. This implies a smaller brain 
gain.
11 
                                                 
11 How does the migration premium for skilled labor compare with that for unskilled labor? If the skills 
obtained in the source country differ substantially from the skills used in the destination country, the   13
2.4. Brain Waste 
Foreign workers are often hired to do jobs for which they are overqualified. 
Examples of Caribbean doctors or Eastern European scientists working as taxi drivers in 
some large US city are well known. Similarly, Moroccan doctors in France are typically 
working in less skilled positions (e.g., as interns) with significantly lower salaries. 
Mattoo, Neagu and Ozden (2005) and Ozden (2005, Chapter 8)) refer to this 
phenomenon as a “brain waste” in their recent study of US immigration. They find that 
the extent of the brain waste—i.e., the difference in the skill content of a migrant’s job 
versus that of a native of the destination country with similar education and experience—
varies according to origin country characteristics and US immigration policies.  
Using the same notation as in Section 2.3 above, the expected benefit of education 
4 B  under skilled migration and brain waste (BW) conditions is:  
i) U S W W B − = 4  for  S BW W W <
* (no  migration),      (9a) 
and  
ii) ) ( ) ( ) ) 1 ( (
* *
4 S BW U S U S BW W W p W W W W p pW B − + − = − − + = for  S BW W W >
* . (9b) 
  In case (i), there is no brain drain or brain gain. In case (ii) where  S BW W W >
*  and a 
brain drain takes place, the difference in benefits without brain waste (B2 in equation (5)) 
and with brain waste (B4 in equation (9b)) is  
                                                                                                                                                 
migration premium for skilled labor is likely to be small. This might occur, for instance, in the case of 
lawyers if the legal systems differ between source and destination countries, or in the case of managers if 
source country firms are small, use outdated management methods and operate in a protected market, or 
simply because the skills are perceived to be inferior due to lack of information. Some of these issues are 
examined in the following section on the ‘brain waste.’ If the skills are similar and highly mobile, as in the 
case of scientists and engineers (especially if they studied in a destination country), one might expect the 
skill premium not to be very large either (unless a corner solution is reached where all the highly skilled 
leave). Thus, the migration premium for unskilled labor might be larger than that for skilled labor.  
   14
0 , 0 ) (
* * *
2 4 < ∂ ∂ < − = − ≡ Δ BW W W W p B B B BW S BW BW .          (10) 
The income loss reduces the impact of the brain drain on the benefit of education, 
implying a smaller brain gain. As can be seen from equation (10), the income loss 
depends on the wage gap between skilled and ‘brain waste’ jobs in the destination 
countries.    
 
2.5. Negative Brain Gain 
Assume that below a critical level of education 0 E , some destination countries 
only hire unskilled workers, irrespective of their qualifications, but nevertheless attract 
both unskilled and skilled migrants because  U S U W W W > >
* . This should reduce the 
incentive to acquire education in source countries, and result in a negative brain gain. 
Note that this case constitutes an extreme version of the “brain waste” case examined 
above in Section 2.4. 
The expected wage rate for unskilled labor is  U U U W p pW W E ) 1 ( ) (
* − + =  and that 
for skilled labor is S U S W p pW W E ) 1 ( ) (
* − + = . The return to education in that case is 
) ( ) )( 1 ( U S U S W W W W p − < − − , the return to education in the absence of migration. In 
other words, the migration option lowers the return to education, resulting in a negative 
net brain gain or net brain loss.   
McKenzie (Chapter 5 in this volume) presents evidence of such an effect in the 
case of rural Mexico, with migration having a negative impact on education levels in 
general and more so for children with more educated parents.
 12 
13 .   
                                                 
12 A more detailed analysis is provided in McKenzie and Rapoport (2005).   15
This type of outcome might also prevail under less extreme forms of “brain 
waste.” For instance, with the high demand for Filipino nurses, some medical doctors 
have gone back to school in order to become nurses, and some students have changed 
their study plans from medicine to nursing. 
 
2.6. Risk Aversion 
Risk aversion is likely to greatly reduce the brain-drain-induced brain gain. The 
new brain drain literature (e.g., Beine et al., 2001, 2003) claims that a net brain gain is 
more likely for low values of the migration probability p. As noted earlier, 
S S W p pW W E ) 1 ( ) (
* − + =  and 
2 * ) ( * ) ( S S W W X W Var − = , where 
2 2 ) 1 ( p p X + − =   and 
2 4 / − = ∂ ∂ p p X . Thus,  p X ∂ ∂ / > (<) 0 for p > (<) .5. This implies that, for p < .5, X 
increases as p falls and so does  ) (W Var . Hence, a low value for p is associated with a 
high value for  ) (W Var , implying a smaller brain gain, with a smaller likelihood of a 
positive net brain gain. For high values of p, the new brain drain literature and this paper 
agree that the net brain drain is negative, even in the absence of risk-aversion.  
There are of course many other sources of uncertainty associated with the fact that 
studies take time to complete and the future is unknown. Sources of uncertainty include 
success in school and the future level of host countries’ skilled wages, the exchange rate, 
skilled wages at home, host countries’ immigration policies, the probability of obtaining a 
job abroad, the allowed length of stay in the host country, and the value of the student’s 
time for the family during the entire period of studies. That value rises when family 
                                                                                                                                                 
13 Thus, migration not only lowers the level of education but also education inequality, with the latter due 
to a reduction in the rural educational level of those at the upper end of the distribution rather than an 
increase at the bottom of the distribution.  
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income falls (due to crop failure, lower crop prices, illness, unemployment), which may 
force some students to abandon their studies and lose their investment. 
In the analysis below, we only consider the uncertainty associated with the fact 
that individuals who consider whether to acquire additional education do not know 
whether they will be selected for migration when they complete their studies. Without 
loss of generality, assume that the cost of education C = 0, and that risk aversion is 
represented by an expected utility function EU. Due to the concavity of the utility 
function, we have: 
   > − + ] * ) 1 ( * [
*
S S W p W p U ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
*
S S W U p W pU EU − + = .    (11)   
In other words, the expected utility of education’s benefit is smaller than the 
utility of the expected benefit, implying a smaller brain gain. However, this is not the end 
of the story. The remaining question is whether the smaller brain drain is positive or zero.  
Given that C W W p W p S S S − > − + * ) 1 ( *
* , we have: 
         ). ( ] * ) 1 ( * [
*
S S S W U W p W p U > − +          ( 1 2 )  
 From equations (11) and (12), it follows that both ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
*
S S W U p W pU EU − + =  
and ) ( S W U  are both smaller than ] * ) 1 ( * [
*
S S W p W p U − + .  Thus, under risk aversion:    
) ( ) 1 ( ) (
*
S S W U p W pU EU − + =  > or < than  ) ( S W U .   (13) 
In other words, whether the expected utility from education with migration 
probability p is larger or smaller than that from education in the absence of migration is 
ambiguous. If  ) ( ) 1 ( ) (
*
S S W U p W pU EU − + = > ) ( S W U , the brain gain is smaller than 
under risk neutrality, which reduces the likelihood of a net brain gain. If 
) ( ) 1 ( ) (
*
S S W U p W pU EU − + = < ) ( S W U , those individuals who did not find it in their   17
interest to acquire education in the absence of migration (when the utility from education 
is ) ( S W U ) will certainly not acquire education under migration since their expected utility 
is even smaller in that case. In other words, there will be no brain gain, just a brain drain, 
implying a net brain loss.  
  Consequently, once skilled migration is allowed by the destination country, the 
brain drain under risk aversion results either in a smaller brain gain or in no brain gain, 
with the net brain gain smaller in the first case, and unambiguously negative in the 
second.  
 
3. Smaller Brain Gain: General Equilibrium Effects   
Spending additional resources on education means fewer resources available for 
other activities. Education is typically provided publicly and is heavily subsidized, 
though an important part of the costs are borne by the students or their families, the main 
one being the opportunity cost of the students’ time.  
In the case of tertiary education, a report by the World Bank (2000) states that 
“with developing country systems heavily dominated by public universities that tend to 
have low tuition fees, the costs fall predominantly on the state.” The report estimates 
these costs relative to GNP for 1995, and finds that the worldwide average amounts to 
77% of GNP per capita.  
Lucas (2004) updated the figures for the year 2000 and, based on both sources, 
finds that 24 out of 90 countries had higher costs than the world average (Table 4.7). For 
Sub-Saharan countries, the cost relative to GNP was over 500% of the world average. 
Implications for the brain gain and human capital are examined below.       18
3.1.  Public Expenditures and Tax Revenues  
 
Assuming that education is provided publicly,
14 an increase in education will 
require additional funds. Moreover, time spent acquiring additional education means less 
work and lower tax revenues. Fiscally responsible authorities can respond to this situation 
by i) a tax increase, ii) a reduction in educational subsidies, or iii) a reduction in other 
public expenditures. 
15 
A reduction in disposable income associated with the tax increase will reduce the 
demand for education and result in a smaller brain gain.
16 Similarly, a reduction in 
educational subsidies will raise the cost of education and will also result in a smaller 
brain gain.  
Implications for transition dynamics and for the steady state, these are the same as 
in Section 2.3 and 2.4.   
  The third option entails a reduction in non-educational public expenditures. To 
check the likelihood of substitution between the two categories of public expenditures, I 
estimated a relationship between public education expenditures (log E) and other capital 
expenditures (log K), both measured as a share of GDP, as well as a number of control 
variables. The sample covered over 70 developing countries, with an average of 7 
observations per country and a total of over 600. A negative and significant relationship 
between log K and log E was obtained with a coefficient of -.47, significant at the 1% 
                                                 
14 The results hold under privately provided education as well. 
15 Note that if fiscal considerations were unimportant because the impact on education is small, the weak 
education response to a brain drain would very likely imply a net brain loss. Thus, general equilibrium 
effects are especially important when the brain gain is large enough to matter.    
16 Of course, a smaller brain gain implies a smaller tax increase, which simply means that the equilibrium 
tax rate and brain gain must be solved simultaneously.     19
level. This indicates that a one percent increase in the share of GDP devoted to education 
results in close to a half percent reduction in the share of other capital expenditures.
17  
This is unlikely to affect the extent of the brain gain, though it might affect 
welfare and growth (see Section 4.2) as well as the extent of the human capital gain. The 
latter is examined below.  
 
3.2. A Brain Gain that Results in a Smaller Human Capital Gain 
As shown in the previous section, an increase in public education expenditures is 
associated with a reduction in other public expenditures. Among those that might be 
curtailed are investments in the country healthcare infrastructure, maintenance, and the 
provision of healthcare services. This would have an adverse impact on the population’s 
health status, and more so for poorer families that have little or no access to private 
healthcare.  
Moreover, because individuals who are studying do not contribute to family 
income, expenditures will have to be reduced, especially in poorer families. If 
expenditures on healthcare are reduced, household health is likely to be adversely 
affected. And if food expenditures are reduced, the nutrition and health status of the 
family is likely to suffer as well.  
In his AEA Presidential address entitled “Investment in Human Capital,” Schultz 
(1961, p. 5) notes that, when adults have a meager diet and cannot work more than a few 
                                                 
17 Interestingly, Beine et al. (2003)’s model includes a variable representing physical capital, R&D 
expenditures and infrastructures in their growth regression, so that a reduction in that variable, associated 
with an increase in the investment in education, might impact welfare and growth.     20
hours a day, food should be treated not just as consumption but as a productive input that 
raises the level of human capital.
18  
Furthermore, purchases of household appliances may have to be postponed, and 
may cause additional harmful effects. For instance, postponing the purchase of a 
refrigerator might not necessarily affect nutrient intake but it would most likely have 
adverse effects on nutritional status and health (Schiff and Valdés 1990a, 1990b).
19  
Since human capital depends on education as well as on health (Schultz, 1961, 
p.3), the impact of the brain drain on human capital is likely to be smaller than its impact 
on the brain gain. An educated workforce that is unable to work on a regular basis 
because of illness is unlikely to be very productive. In fact, reduced spending on health 
by individual families and the public sector might have devastating effects on the 
populations’ health status and might lower the stock of human capital.
20 Thus, a negative 
human capital gain might obtain. Whether the human capital gain is positive or negative, 
it is most likely to be smaller than the brain gain.  
     
 
                                                 
18 Costa (2003) examines the long-run relationship between health and economic activity. Alderman et al. 
(2003), Martorell (1999) and Strauss and Thomas (1998) examine the link between nutrition and 
productivity.  
 
19 In the face of high food income elasticity estimates at low incomes and the implication that the poor 
suffered from malnutrition, the nutrition literature argued that what mattered is not food but nutrient intake 
and showed a low income elasticity for a variety of nutrients (calories, proteins, etc.) because, starting at 
low incomes, food expenditures shift from nutrient to non-nutrient attributes as income increases (due to 
greater demand for variety, ease of preparation and taste), with the implication that the poor do not suffer 
from malnutrition. Schiff and Valdés (1990a, 1990b) contributed to that literature by arguing that what 
matters is not nutrient intake but nutritional status, which depends on various household and community 
variables as well as on nutrients. Since investments in the former clearly depend on income (e.g., 
refrigerators and clean water), nutritional status is likely to be quite elastic with respect to income (and thus 
be worse for poor people), even if nutrient intake is not.  
20 This might occur because, even though a benign (and knowledgeable) government would be expected to 
take these negative externalities into account, individual households would not.     21
4. Smaller Impact on Welfare and Growth 
  Based on the analysis in the previous sections, this section examines the impact of 
the brain gain on welfare and growth and compares it with claims made in the new brain 
drain literature.    
   
4.1. Brain Gain Size 
The previous section provided a number of arguments based on both partial and 
general equilibrium analytical frameworks and supporting the assertion of a significantly 
smaller brain gain and, by implication, a significantly smaller net brain gain than would 
appear from the literature. The obvious implication is that the impact on welfare and 
growth would also be significantly smaller. 
 
4.2. General Equilibrium Effects 
Romer’s (1986) seminal paper on endogenous growth posited that, due to positive 
externalities, returns to physical capital were increasing, and that policies affecting the 
stock of physical capital could permanently change the economy’s growth rate. Lucas 
(1988) also provided a model of endogenous growth but emphasized the role human 
capital. I assume in this section that both human and physical capital affect the 
economy’s growth rate through contemporaneous externalities, intergenerational 
externalities (a la Beine et al., 2003), or both.      
Section 3.1 listed three ways to deal with the higher public expenditures and 
lower tax revenues associated with a brain gain, namely higher taxes, lower education 
subsidies, or a reduction in other public expenditures. The first two lower the demand for   22
education. The third one either lowers the level of human capital if, say, healthcare 
expenditures are reduced, or lowers other public expenditures that are likely to generate 
positive externalities.    
The new brain drain literature assumes that education is the only sector that 
generates positive externalities. In fact, positive externalities are also generated by a 
number of other public (and private) sector activities as well. These activities include 
healthcare provision, investment in R&D, and the provision of many other public goods 
where the presence of very large externalities and the temptation to free ride explains 
why these are provided publicly rather than privately.  
In such a case, a government would maximize welfare through a tax and 
expenditure policy that results in the equalization of the per-currency-unit social marginal 
present value across all activities, whether private or public, consumption or investment, 
and pecuniary or not. Internalizing all the externalities associated with education, without 
taking into account the reduction in other expenditures and the consequent loss of other 
positive externalities, reduces the impact of the brain gain on welfare and growth and 
may result in a welfare loss and a lower growth rate.  
The full effect of an increase in the brain drain would have to include the loss due 
to the brain drain itself. In other words, there are now two negative effects (the brain 
drain and the impact of the reduction in other expenditures) and a positive one (the brain 
gain). Thus, the likelihood of a beneficial brain drain seems much diminished.   
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5. Dynamic Implications of Endogenous Migration Probability and Domestic Wages  
Two assumptions prevalent in the new brain drain literature seem questionable. 
The first assumption is that the source country determines the migration probability (i.e., 
the share of migrants in the skilled population). The second one is that the migration 
probability is exogenous. Another assumption in the new brain drain literature is that the 
domestic (source country) skilled wage rate is exogenous. This need not be the case and 
the case of endogenous wages is considered as well. The analysis in Section 5.1 is based 
on partial equilibrium and an exogenous domestic wage rate, while a general equilibrium 
analysis with an endogenous wage rate is assumed in Section 5.2. 
  
5.1. Partial Equilibrium and Exogenous Domestic Wage Rate 
In this section, I argue that the migration probability is endogenous and examine 
the dynamics of the brain drain and the brain gain.  
 
      5.1.1. Who Determines the Brain Drain? 
The first assumption described above relates to the source country’s ability to 
determine the probability or rate of migration. This assumption is found in most studies 
in the new brain drain literature. For instance, Stark and Wang (2002) examine the role of 
a migration policy implemented by source country governments.   
In fact, though trade and capital flows have been greatly liberalized, destination 
countries continue to impose strict barriers on immigration. Exceptions include a few 
repressive regimes—e.g., Cuba, Myanmar and North Korea--that deny their citizens the   24
right to migrate. The number of such regimes has greatly diminished in recent years, 
mainly due to the collapse of the Soviet bloc.  
Thus, except for a few countries, migration controls are firmly in the hands of 
destination countries’ authorities. This is particularly true for the more skilled migrants 
who have less to gain by migrating illegally.   
 
5.1.2. Migration Probability and Evolution of the Brain Drain and Brain Gain     
The second assumption in the new brain drain literature is that the probability of 
migration is exogenously given and is unaffected by individuals’ education decisions. 
However, I am not aware of any destination country immigration policy that stipulates 
that a specific percentage of a source country’s skilled individuals is allowed entry. 
Rather, destination countries tend to use numerical quotas in order to restrict entry. In that 
case, the migration probability is endogenous, and its value depends on the size S of the 
skilled population. These quotas are (almost) always filled. Denote the quota by BD (the 
brain drain).  
The models in the new brain drain literature typically start from a situation of zero 
migration and compare it with that of positive migration. The starting migration 
probability  p0  =  BD/S0, where BD is the brain drain which is determined by the 
destination country (i.e., the quota of skilled immigrants) and S0 is the skilled population 
in period t = 0 before migration takes place.  
Models in the new brain drain literature assume that the migration probability p is 
a constant that is determined exogenously. If so, those who are considering at t = 0 
whether to acquire additional education take the migration probability at t = 1 (when they   25
graduate) as being the one they observe at t = 0 when they must make the education 
decision. That probability is p0. In other words,  0 1 p p
e = , where 
e p1  is the probability 
expected to prevail at t = 1.
21 The fact that  0 1 p p
e =  = BD/S0 is now positive raises the 
expected return on education and results in a brain gain BG1. Thus, BG1 is a function of 
0 1 p p
e = , i.e., BG1 = BG(p0). More generally:   
), ( 1 − = t t p BG BG 0 ' ' , 0 ' < > BG BG .           ( 1 4 )    
We start, at t = 0, from a steady-state situation where the number of individuals 
acquiring education before migration becomes an option is equal to the number of 
retirees (per period of time). With migration, the benefit of education increases, and new 
individuals decide to acquire education (the brain gain). Then, S1 = S0 +  1 S Δ  = S0 + (BG1 
– BD). More generally: 
St = St-1 +  t S Δ  = St-1 + (BGt – BD) = ∑ = − +
t
i i BD BG S
1 0 ) ( .       (15) 
Note that with the brain drain BD determined by the host-country quota, the only 
variable is the brain gain BG. 
  
                                                 
21 The model where such expectations are used is known as the cobweb model. The assumption of such 
expectations is certainly more plausible for the brain gain than in the case of crop prices, the case for which 
the cobweb model was originally developed. One reason is that the assessment about the probability of 
migration is made by different individuals every period, while the same farmers and traders operate over 
many periods and therefore have a better understanding of the markets in which they operate. A second 
reason is the availability of information. Information on (spot and futures) commodity prices is available in 
real time on a continuous basis through various electronic media outlets, which is certainly not the case for 
the future migration probability. Consequently, learning about the latter  is much harder than for 
agricultural prices and is thus less likely, making the assumed expectations formation rule quite plausible in 
the migration case. Note that the same expectations rule obtains in the case of uncertainty (e.g., if there is a 
random disturbance term in equation (1)) in various rational expectations equilibrium models, resulting in a 
‘random walk’ where  pt = pt-1 + et-1  and e t-1  is a ‘white noise’ error term, so that Et-1 (pt) = pt-1.  Note that 
in this case, the expectations solution is the result of individuals exploiting all the available information 
rather than due to ignorance of how the market operates. Such a model may provide a good description of 
homogeneous commodities traded on a centralized commodities exchange but not for the case of migration. 
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         5.1.3. No Beneficial Brain Drain in the Steady State  
  The initial stock of educated people is S0. The increase in the stock between 
periods 0 and 1 is  1 S Δ  = BG1 – BD, which is either positive or negative. Assume that in 
the first transition path, BG1 – BD > 0. In that case, the number of skilled people 
increases to S1 > S0 and the migration probability decreases to p1 = BD/S1 < p0 = BD/S0. 
From equation (14), BG2 < BG1 and  2 S Δ < 1 S Δ . Over time, the stock St increases at a 
decreasing rate until period j where  j S Δ  = 0, with a steady-state stock St = S
P
 for all t ≥ j. 
In the second transition path,  1 S Δ  = BG1 – BD < 0. Then, S1 < S0, BG2 > BG1, 
1 2 S S Δ < Δ , and St falls at a decreasing rate. This process continues until period k where 
k S Δ  = 0. The steady-state stock is St = S
N for all t ≥ k. 
The first (second) transition path results in a steady-state stock S
P (S
N) that is 
larger (smaller) than the initial one. Thus,  S
P > S0 > S
N.  
The previous sections presented a number of arguments in order to show that the 
brain gain is smaller than argued in the new brain drain literature and that the net brain 
gain is likely to be negative during the transition period). If so, migration leads to a 
decline in the stock of educated people or a smaller stock in steady state. 
 In the steady state, we have:  
j S Δ  =  k S Δ  = BG – BD =   0 ,        ( 1 6 )  
where BG is the value of BGt that solves equation (16).  
Thus, the net brain gain NBG ≡ BG – BD = 0 in the steady state, irrespective of 
the transition path. In other words, the brain gain is not large enough to result in a net 
brain gain--or beneficial brain drain--in the long run. This result is due to the assumption   27
that the initial (pre-migration) situation is characterized by a steady state with a constant 
number of educated people.  
Alternatively, assume that the initial, pre-migration, situation is characterized by a 
net increase in the number of educated people equal to E. Then, the steady-state solution 
under migration is: E + BG – BD = 0, implying that NBG ≡ BG – BD = - E < 0. In other 
words, the steady state is characterized by a net brain loss in that case.  
These results hold under other expectation formation rules as well, including 
perfect foresight, rational expectations (see latter part of footnote 21) and adaptive 
expectations.
22 The new brain drain literature claims that a brain drain results in a net 
brain gain under certain conditions. The analysis in this section shows that this result 
cannot hold in the long run.  
Finally, a number of arguments have been presented in the paper to show that the 
brain gain is smaller than can be inferred from the new brain drain literature, and that the  
net brain gain is likely to be negative. That would imply a smaller stock of educated 
people in the steady state than in the pre-migration equilibrium.   
  
  5.2. Partial and General Equilibrium with Endogenous Skilled Wage Rate 
Under partial equilibrium analysis, an endogenous domestic wage implies that the 
source country’s skilled wage rate   S W  changes with the supply of educated people. In 
fact,  S W  falls (rises) for NBG > (<) 0 in period t = 1 (when migration starts). The positive 
(negative) NBG falls (increases) faster because two forces are at play rather than one: the 
                                                 
22 Convergence to the steady state is faster under perfect foresight and rational expectations, and is slower 
under adaptive expectations.  
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reduction (increase) in the migration probability, as well as the fall (rise) in  S W . This 
results in a faster rate of convergence to the (unchanged) steady state.    
  Once might expect the same result to hold in general equilibrium, though this is 
not necessarily the case. For instance, assume a 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin model with a 
Hicks-neutral technological advantage in the developed host countries (resulting in higher 
wages than in the developing source countries), and with skilled and unskilled labor 
inputs.
23 In such a setting, a small economy’s input and output prices are determined by 
world prices, domestic trade policy, and the technology gap. In that case, a positive 
(negative) net brain gain NBG results in a reallocation of resources towards (away from) 
the skill-intensive activity and has no impact on input prices.  
If the reallocation continues indefinitely, specialization will ensue, with all 
resources allocated to the skill-intensive sector for NBG > 0 and to the unskilled-labor-
intensive sector for NBG < 0. However, we have seen that the NBG converges to zero as 
the economy approaches the steady state. If the steady-state is reached before 
specialization takes place, the analysis with an exogenous domestic wage carries through.  
On the other hand, if specialization is reached before the steady state, the 
domestic wage rate  S W  falls (rises) as the number of skilled individuals increases (falls), 
and we are back to the partial equilibrium solution. The same outcome obtains for other 




                                                 
23 The 2x2 model is assumed for simplicity. The same outcome obtains in an ‘m x m’ model (m > 2) with 
labor classified according to m skill categories.     29
6. Empirical Evidence 
This paper has argued that the net brain gain NBG is closer to NBG2 (see Figure 1) 
than to NBG1. In fact, NBG1 is quite similar to the function shown in Figure 6 in 
Docquier and Rapoport (2004), and reproduced here as Figure 4. The vertical axis 
measures the effect on the annual growth rate rather than the effect on NBG. Despite the 
fact that Figure 4 depicts an estimated relationship while Figure 3 does not, they tell a 
similar story, namely that a beneficial brain drain is more likely at low migration rates. 
As Beine et al. (2003, p.35) state: “ … most countries combining low levels of human 
capital and low emigration rates of their highly-educated are positively affected by the 
brain drain.”  
On the other hand, and as shown in Figures 1 and 4, high migration rates (larger 
than p1) inevitably result in a lower NBG and rate of growth. Consequently, countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean as well as others that are suffering from massive 
outflows of medical personnel and other skilled workers cannot hope for much help from 
the brain gain effect, irrespective of whether NBG = NBG1  or NBG = NBG2.  
Three studies have examined the impact of the brain drain on education levels or 
growth. As mentioned above, Beine et al. (2003) obtain a beneficial brain drain for 
countries with low levels of human capital and skilled migration rates. On the other hand, 
Faini (2005) finds little indication of a positive impact of the brain drain on growth in 
source countries, while Lucas (2005)—using two alternative definitions for the education 
variable—obtains a negative impact of the brain drain on education (see Table 1).  
So far, empirical analysis consists of three studies generating three different sets 
of results with respect to the impact of the brain drain: a positive impact on the level of   30
education (Beine et al.) for small brain drain rates, a negative impact on the level of 
education (Lucas) and no impact on growth (Faini). These results should be considered as 
preliminary, and additional conceptual and empirical work is needed before any 
conclusion can be reached.  
 
7. Concluding Comments  
Based on static analysis, this paper has shown that the size of the brain gain as 
well as its impact on welfare and growth are significantly smaller that found in the new 
brain drain literature and may even be negative. Arguments include the fact that  
i)  abilities are heterogeneous and high-ability individuals—those who 
acquired skills when migration was not an option and the returns to 
education were lower--will also emigrate, resulting in a lower average 
ability level for the educated people remaining in the source country;  
ii)  unskilled individuals migrate as well and benefit from it, implying that the 
brain drain has a smaller impact on the return to education;  
iii)  the education benefit is subject to a high degree of uncertainty (e.g., with 
respect to educational success, future employment abroad, host countries’ 
future migration policies, and whether the individual will be among the 
few who migrate), and so is the cost of education (e.g., due to changes in 
the opportunity cost of time during the study period caused, say, by 
income or health problems in the student’s family);   
iv)  brain waste, which in extreme form results in a negative brain gain; and   31
v)  additional resources spent on education imply greater public and private 
expenditures and--since students do not work fulltime or at all--fewer 
taxes and less household income, resulting in a reduction in other 
externality-generating public and private expenditures, such as 
expenditures on health and public infrastructure, resulting in a smaller and 
possibly negative impact on welfare and growth.   
 
An analysis of the dynamics of the brain drain shows that the net brain gain is 
equal to zero in the steady state. In other words, a ‘beneficial brain drain’ cannot occur in 
the steady state. Moreover, a net brain loss is likely to hold during the transition.  
Dynamic aspects of the brain-drain-induced brain gain are also examined in this 
paper. It is shown that the brain drain is equal to the brain gain in steady state, so that a 
beneficial brain drain cannot take place in the long run. Moreover, the net brain gain is 
likely to be negative during the transition period, so that the new steady-state is 
characterized by a lower level of the education stock.  
Contributors to the early brain drain literature viewed the brain drain as entailing 
a loss for the developing source countries. An implication of the arguments presented in 
this paper is that these contributors were close to the mark.  
The new brain drain literature and this paper are in agreement on one point, 
namely that the net brain gain is negative for larger migration probabilities and certainly 
in the most severe brain drain cases. In other words, the new brain drain literature offers 
no solution to the most severe brain drain problems. This includes the exodus of   32
healthcare providers from Sub-Sahara Africa--the world’s poorest region--and the 
Caribbean 
Consequently, policies to slow down or stop the exodus of skilled labor are 
urgently needed. This issue is beyond the scope of this paper, though it might be worth 
examining the possibility of i) host countries supporting—both financially and with 
expertise--education in source countries in the areas where they expect to need skilled 
labor in the future, together with ii) instituting programs of temporary migration (possibly 
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Table reproduced from Lucas (2005). 
OLS; SE Robust; t-stats in parentheses; intercepts included, not shown. 
Brain Drain: OECD (2000) 
Tertiary Enrollment: UNESCO (several years)
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